Security and encryption
HTTPS is TLS 1.3 only — TLS 1.2 is an administrator opt-in. HSTS and Secure cookies are on. Secrets, credentials and backups use AES-256-GCM envelope encryption, with an Argon2id or 0600-wrapped key and first-class key rotation. Passwords are Argon2id. Licenses, project images and revocation lists are Ed25519-signed. Gateway and edge links use mutual TLS. MQTT, SMTP and database connections use TLS. PLC fieldbus is not natively encrypted; the local SQLite historian is not page-encrypted.
Facts from the current software — TLS 1.3, AES-256-GCM, Argon2id and Ed25519 — not a roadmap, and not a claim that every protocol and every file is encrypted.
HTTPS is on by default, and it is TLS 1.3 only. TLS 1.2 is offered only when an administrator turns on a fallback for named legacy clients. HSTS is set on HTTPS responses. Cookies are HttpOnly, SameSite, and Secure on HTTPS. WebSockets run over WSS on the same TLS listener.
A self-signed ECDSA P-384 certificate is generated on first run, with the private key stored mode 0600. Administrators import a real site certificate in Gateway Admin. Until that import, the channel is encrypted, but the peer is not yet authenticated by a public CA.
Gateway-to-gateway and edge links use mutual TLS. MQTT runs over TLS. SMTP requires STARTTLS or implicit TLS — cleartext AUTH is refused. Database connections (Postgres, Timescale, MySQL, SQL Server) require TLS. Local SQLite is a file, not a network session.
The OPC UA server offers Aes256_Sha256_RsaPss SignAndEncrypt and Basic256Sha256 SignAndEncrypt first. A None-mode session is for compatibility only and is not encrypted. The client prefers SignAndEncrypt when the operator sets that mode.
Configuration secrets, credentials and backups use AES-256-GCM envelope encryption. The data key is wrapped by a 0600 machine-local key file or an Argon2id administrator passphrase. Key rotation is a first-class command. Sealed project images are AES-256-GCM and Ed25519, bound to the site and the machine.
Administrator and operator passwords are hashed with Argon2id. Existing iterated SHA-256 hashes are still verified and are rehashed to Argon2id on a successful login. Licenses, project images and revocation lists are Ed25519-signed. License payloads are signed, not secret — treat a license as a capability, not a password.
Live writes to a controller are an administrator-controlled, audited capability. Safety, motor and PLC-mode commands stay on a blocklist that cannot be turned off. An optional tag allow-list can further limit what may be written. Program download, firmware and run/stop remain in the vendor engineering tool.
PLC fieldbus protocols such as Modbus TCP, EtherNet/IP and S7 are not natively encrypted. Recommended mitigations: CIP Security where the controller and this site's driver support it, a segmented OT network, a VPN or IPsec tunnel, or an edge gateway next to the PLC with an encrypted uplink — and only a short last hop on the trusted segment. The local SQLite historian is not page-encrypted; use encrypted backups and disk encryption.
Encryption is a headline strength of the runtime. It is not a claim that every protocol and every file is encrypted.
Fieldbus is mitigated by network design and encrypted uplinks, not by pretending Modbus, EtherNet/IP or S7 is an encrypted channel. The local SQLite historian and on-disk audit files are not page-encrypted in this build; encrypted backups and an encrypted volume are the controls, and remote historian connections require TLS. A first-run self-signed certificate encrypts the channel before a site certificate is imported, but the peer is not yet authenticated by a public CA. An OPC UA session negotiated at SecurityPolicy None is not encrypted.
A non-safety design. Secure Sorter is not a safety controller and does not claim a SIL or PL rating. It may display safety status. It does not command a safety function. E-stop graphics on a screen are not safety devices.
Write to [email protected].
